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1.  Introduction 
The referral of job seekers to vacancies is a policy that is used by many countries, yet little is known 
about the effectiveness of this approach. In a meta-analysis of the effectiveness research regarding 
active labor market policies (ALMP's) (Card et al. 2010), the "Services and Sanctions"- type of ALMP 
is considered. These are policies that are aimed at enhancing the job search efficiency and effort. 
Examples are job search courses, job clubs, vocational guidance, counselling and monitoring, and 
sanctions in the case of non-compliance with job search requirements. The referral procedure clearly 
belongs to this category. As to their effectiveness, Card et al. (2010) conclude that this type of ALMP 
turns out to be particularly promising, as, on average, their effects on the probability to leave 
unemployment towards employment are positive, while at the same time this kind of policies are 
relatively inexpensive. 
Specific analysis on the effectiveness of referrals is rare. On the basis of a randomized experiment in 
Sweden, Engström et al. (2012) conclude that a large fraction (one third) of job referrals do not result 
in job applications. If the Public Employment Service (PES) announces that it will contact the 
employer to verify whether referred vacancies have been applied to, the job application rate increases. 
However, the policy does not affect unemployment duration. Moreover, van den Berg and Vikström 
(2014) argue that the verification whether referred jobs have been applied to, and are accepted or not, 
can downgrade the quality of the job.  
Fougère et al. (2009) study whether or not in France vacancy referral provided by the PES crowds out 
the more costly job search of the unemployed worker. Such crowding out could explain why vacancy 
referrals do not automatically boost the job finding rate. Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006), for 
instance, find that in The Netherlands the monitoring of formal job search crowds out informal job 
search. By contrast, Fougère et al. find that in France contacts brought about by the PES are more 
often transformed into a hiring proposal vacancy than private search, especially for the low educated 
and low skilled workers. Hence, in France vacancy referrals enhance the exit rate from unemployment, 
especially for disadvantaged workers, even if application to these jobs was neither monitored nor, 
consequently, sanctioned. 
Van den Berg et al. (2014) investigate the effects of repeated meetings between the unemployed and 
their case worker on the transition rate from unemployment to employment in Denmark. They find 
large positive effects of the meetings. Moreover, the transition rate strongly increases in the week the 
meeting is held and remains significantly higher up to eight weeks later. For women this effect even 
persists for a longer period, be it at a lower level. The effect size tends to increase with the number of 
meetings. Interestingly, they conclude that meeting effects appear to be driven by highly significant 
vacancy referral effects. 
In Germany, a refusal to apply to a vacancy referral can be punished by an unemployment benefit 
sanction. Van den Berg et al. (2013) analyze the effects of these sanctions and of the vacancy referrals 
on unemployment duration and job quality. Their results suggest that sanctions increase the probability 
of finding a job, but that the wages of sanctioned individuals are lower in the subsequent jobs. 
Receiving a vacancy referral has a positive effect on the job finding probability, but also leads to less 
stable employment spells and lower wages. Vacancy referrals have a stronger impact on the 
probability of finding a job if the local unemployment rate is high. However, the authors also find an 
increased sickness absence shortly after vacancy referrals by case workers (during sickness spells, the 
minimum requirements on job search do not apply).  
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Given that studies on this topic are scarce, additional research evidence on the topic is welcome. 
Moreover, the operational features of the referral procedures in other countries differ from those in 
Flanders. For instance, in France the application to job referrals is not mandatory, whereas in Germany 
this is mandatory and sanctioned. Since these operational features can affect the effectiveness of the 
scheme, it is important to gather more evidence on different schemes, so that the extent to which these 
features matter, can be studied in a more systematic way.  
2.  Institutional context  
In general, if a Belgian worker loses his job, he will be entitled to unemployment benefits, provided 
that he contributed to the unemployment system while he was working. Eligibility depends on the 
length of the previous employment spell, and this length increases with age: whereas someone below 
36 should have worked 12 months during the previous 18 months in order to be eligible, unemployed 
between 36 and 49 should have worked 18 months in the previous 27 months, and someone who is 50 
or older should have worked 24 months within the previous 36 months.  
The level of unemployment benefits in Belgium depends on the last wage, elapsed unemployment 
duration, on family status, and on age. The benefits are provided without time limit.  
In order to remain eligible for unemployment benefits, once unemployed, unemployment has to be 
involuntary.  This implies that the unemployed is not allowed to turn down what is called a suitable 
job offer. According to the law, under some strict conditions, job offers are not suitable: This is e.g. 
the case if one has to commute daily more than four hours in order to get to the job, or if accepting the 
job implies that one's income decreases. A third principle, which is only valid during the first six 
months of the unemployment spell, states that a job offer is not suitable if it does not relate to the 
professional skills acquired by the unemployed.  
Unemployed persons who turn down suitable job offers, run a risk of obtaining an unemployment 
benefit sanction: a temporary or permanent reduction or withdrawal of their unemployment benefit. 
Unemployment benefit sanctions can also be obtained is case of a refusal to participate in vocational 
training, in case of fraud, and in case of undeclared work. Starting in 2004, the long term unemployed 
regularly have to prove their job search efforts. Non-compliance can give rise to an unemployment 
benefit sanction.  
Belgium has a multi-layered federal system. Over the course of several decades, a series of 
constitutional reforms have devolved ever more powers to the regional authorities (both Regions and 
Communities).  The unemployment benefit system, including the sanctioning authority, is run by the 
RVA/ONEM, a federal institution, i.e. on the Belgian level. The Regions, on the other hand, also have 
wide powers regarding labor market issues such as active labor market policies and the matching of 
demand and supply on the labor market through the (regional) Public Employment Services (PES).  
Given this division of tasks, noncompliance with eligibility requirements, such as a refusal to accept a 
suitable job or to participate in a vocational training, typically will be observed by the regional PES. In 
that case, they can report this to the federal RVA/ONEM, which accordingly will decide whether or 
not an unemployment sanction is in order. 
In Flanders, the Northern part of Belgium, the regional PES is called VDAB. In the year 2007, the 
VDAB reported 32615 cases of noncompliance with eligibility requirements to the RVA/ONEM (to 
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put this number into perspective, in 2007 there were on average 143035 unemployed persons receiving 
an unemployment benefit). In 44% of the reported cases, a sanction followed. 
The VDAB keeps an unemployment register with information (age, education, place of residence, 
work experience, job preferences, etc.) of the persons who currently are unemployed. At the same 
time, the VDAB maintains a database with the job vacancies that are currently available. Both 
databases are regularly compared in order to find whether suitable matches can be found between an 
unemployed and a job vacancy. These matches are subsequently used in various ways. In the 
notification procedure, an unemployed person will be informed that a (potentially) adequate match has 
been found for him or her. The unemployed person, however, is not required to respond to the 
notification. In the so called referral procedure (which is the subject of this paper), more commitment 
is imposed. Here the matching between job characteristics and the unemployed is partly standardized 
and partly based on the appreciation of caseworkers. Upon referral, application to the vacancy is 
compulsory. Non-compliance can result in a sanction, such as a reduction or temporary withdrawal of 
the unemployment benefit. 
In Bollens and Heylen (2009) the effectiveness of the notification procedure for new entrants in 
unemployment was investigated. After controlling for selection on observables in a propensity score 
matching-approach, the notification was found to have no effect on the transition rate from 
unemployment to employment. From the literature we can deduce two possible explanations for this 
finding: (i) the high standardization of the notification procedure may lead to a low quality of the 
match between the requirements of the referred vacancy and the characteristics of the unemployed 
worker; (ii) the notification procedure is not compulsory, so that the positive ‘threat’ effect of a 
sanction in case of non-compliance in a mandatory scheme is lacking.  
The referral procedure is clearly different in the last two mentioned respects: (i) vacancy referrals are 
not completely standardized and automated, since caseworkers appreciate the adequacy of the match; 
(ii) application to the referred vacancy is mandatory.  This justifies investigating whether, in contrast 
to the notification procedure, the referral procedure does positively affect the transition rate from 
unemployment to employment. 
In fact, one cannot speak of the referral approach as such, since it relates to a collection of several 
related but different approaches, as can be seen in Figure 1. A first important distinction has to do with 
the question whether there is caseworker intervention or not. In the year 2007, some referrals were 
sent to the unemployed without any caseworker intervention. These so-called automatic referrals, 
based on matching software, are akin to the notification procedure. As with the notifications, one can 
expect a low quality of the match between the requirements of the referred vacancy and the 
characteristics of the unemployed worker. An obvious difference with the notifications, however, is 
that the unemployed who receives this referral, has to act on it. In recent years, the automatic referrals 
have become quantitatively less important, as the PES considered them to be less efficient. 
In a second type of referral caseworkers intervene. We distinguish between the direct and the indirect 
approach. In the direct approach, the caseworker refers the unemployed to a given vacancy by mail or 
by phone. In the indirect approach, the caseworker again starts with a match between a vacancy and an 
unemployed, but instead of sending a referral, she invites the unemployed to the office in order to 
discuss the appropriateness of the match. Depending on show-up and, in case of show-up, on the 
outcome of this meeting, either a referral is given or not.  
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Figure 1 The referral approach 
The fact that it is mandatory to apply after receiving a referral, and that it is mandatory to show up at 
the PES-meeting after receiving an invitation, obviously is an important characteristic of these 
policies. Therefore it is important to know whether all implied unemployed workers are fully aware of 
this mandatory character, and whether compliance with these obligations is monitored and sanctioned. 
On the basis of an internal survey done by the VDAB itself, one can conclude that several distinct 
referral procedures are used within the organisation, implying that this important message is 
communicated in more and in less formal ways to the referred unemployed. Generally, one may 
however assume that the referred unemployed indeed will be aware of the mandatory nature.  
The situation is quite different with respect to the follow up of the obligation to apply for the vacancy. 
In the year 2007, for barely 25% of all referrals the VDAB could say whether or not the unemployed 
had applied. For the remaining 75%, this is not monitored. This is not actively followed up, because 
one wants to minimise the administrative burden for the employers with vacancies. This lack of 
information also implies that one does not systematically report non-compliance to the RVA/ONEM. 
The internal survey done by the VDAB itself indicates that such reporting does occur, but rather 
occasionally than systematically.  
3. Data 
We use data from the unemployment register as collected by the VDAB, the public employment 
service in Flanders. The dataset consists of individual records. Anyone who enters unemployment is 
recorded in the month of entrance. The dataset moreover has information on the labor market position 
of the individual at the end of all calendar months (either unemployed or employed). 
We selected the unemployment spells that started with unemployment benefit receipt in 2007. This 
excludes voluntary registered job seekers (e.g. those who were previously inactive, and decided to start 
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working again).  This also excludes school-leavers, who are not entitled to an unemployment benefit1. 
In order to make the sample more homogeneous, we removed all spells of unemployed who are 
younger than 25 at the beginning of the spell2. 
The duration of the unemployment spell is defined as the time until employment has been found. We 
observe transitions to employment, but do not have additional information about this employment 
situation. Unemployment spells that are still ongoing at the end of the period covered by the dataset, 
i.e. at the end of September 2010, are right censored at that point. There is also right censoring in case 
of a transition from unemployment to inactivity. The spell of someone who participates in a training, is 
right censored at the start of the training program. 
In another database, the PES collects information with respect to the treatments (either a referral, an 
automatic referral or an invitation). We know the exact date at which an individual was referred to a 
(automatic) vacancy or obtained an invitation. For each unemployment spell in the sample of spells 
that started in 2007, we checked whether a treatment had been given before the end of that spell. When 
an individual receives more than one treatment during the course of the unemployment spell, only the 
first occurrence is selected. This can either be a referral, an invitation or an automatic referral. If a 
second treatment occurs at a later duration, the unemployment duration is right censored at that point. 
The duration until obtaining a referral is defined as the time from the start of the unemployment spell 
until the date of obtaining a (first) treatment. For someone who does not receive a treatment, this 
duration is right censored when the person makes a transition to employment, inactivity or training, or 
at the end of the period covered by the dataset, whichever comes first. 
These selection criteria gave rise to a sample of 129305 spells that started in 2007. For computational 
reasons, a random sample of 10% was selected, leading to a sample size of 12,983 cases. Table 1 
provides some descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. These are all measured at the 
beginning of the unemployment spell, except the local unemployment rate (not included in table 1), 
which varies on a monthly basis3 . This time varying local unemployment rate takes account of 
seasonal and business cycle effects. 
Of the unemployment spells that started in 2007, almost 26% did get a treatment.  When comparing 
the spells with and without treatment, it can be seen that there is some selection on observables, but in 
general differences between both groups tend to be small. Those who received a treatment on average 
are slightly older and males have a slightly higher probability to be treated, but differences related to 
educational attainment are somewhat more marked: whereas the lower skilled (no secondary degree) 
have a higher probability to be treated, those with a tertiary degree have a lower probability. This 
observation may be related to the dynamic sorting process: unemployed workers with a higher 
educational attainment in general will leave unemployment sooner as compared to unemployed with a 
lower educational level, and therefore have less chance to be treated.  
 
 
                                                          
1  School leavers who acquire a minimal level of attainment are entitled to unemployment benefits after 
9 months if they are younger than 26 and after one year if they are older. Since the waiting period has been 
increased to one year for those younger than 26. 
2  The other removed spells relate to spells of unemployed with a disability, spells of persons who are 
older than 65 and spells of persons who live outside Flanders (i.e. in Brussels or in Wallonia). 
3  This unemployment rate is measured at the district level (“arrondissement”). 
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Table 1  Summary statistics 
Variables All Treated 
Not-
treated Referral Invitation 
Autom. 
Referral 
 
a= 
b+c 
b= 
d+e+f c d e f 
N 12983 3353 9630 1311 1497 545 
Sex (woman=1) 0.500 0.475 0.509 0.498 0.455 0.475 
Age (in years) 36.9 37.5 36.7 37.5 37.7 37.2 
25-40 0.626 0.599 0.635 0.593 0.609 0.589 
40-50 0.257 0.271 0.252 0.296 0.234 0.314 
50+ 0.117 0.129 0.113 0.111 0.157 0.097 
# months unempl. in the preceding 2 
years 6.5 6.9 6.3 7.4 6.6 6.9 
Education level       
No secondary degree 0.411 0.463 0.393 0.449 0.463 0.499 
Secondary degree 0.361 0.359 0.362 0.349 0.374 0.343 
Tertiary degree 0.228 0.177 0.245 0.202 0.163 0.158 
Tertiary (outside university) 0.170 0.141 0.179 0.158 0.136 0.117 
Tertiary (university) 0.058 0.036 0.066 0.044 0.027 0.040 
Educational track       
General track 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.087 0.088 0.106 
Technical track 0.166 0.165 0.166 0.157 0.177 0.152 
Vocational track 0.278 0.298 0.271 0.294 0.311 0.273 
Province of residence       
Antwerpen 0.296 0.306 0.293 0.240 0.359 0.316 
Vlaams Brabant 0.150 0.154 0.148 0.146 0.169 0.130 
West Vlaanderen 0.165 0.162 0.166 0.196 0.126 0.180 
Oost Vlaanderen 0.245 0.218 0.254 0.285 0.168 0.194 
Limburg 0.144 0.160 0.139 0.132 0.178 0.180 
Driving license 0.795 0.781 0.799 0.755 0.813 0.754 
Mother tongue = Dutch 0.797 0.782 0.802 0.770 0.819 0.712 
Belgian 0.891 0.887 0.892 0.878 0.914 0.837 
 
The educational track refers to the objective of the subject chosen in secondary education, for those 
whose highest educational level is either a higher secondary degree or a lower secondary degree. The 
vocational track prepares for a direct transition to a profession, whereas the general and the technical 
tracks prepare for a transition to tertiary education. 
The dataset covers the period August 1995 until September 2010. This implies that it is possible to 
control for the recent labor market history (before the current unemployment spell), at least if the 
person has been in unemployment recently. As suggested by Heckman e.a. (1997), and Blundell e.a. 
(2004), the recent labor market history can be a crucial component in an non-experimental evaluation, 
as it is possibly correlated with non-observed characteristics that are driving the employability of the 
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person (assuming that this relation is stable over time). This is realized through a variable measuring 
the number of months in unemployment within the 24 months that precede the current unemployment 
spell. Table 1 indicates that there is a difference between the treated and the non-treated, but the 
difference is rather small. 
The right hand side of table 1 compares the three different treatment types. The automatic referrals are 
quantitatively less important than referrals and invitations.  
4. Econometric modelling 
To estimate the impact of the treatment on the rate of transition to employment, the labor market 
outcomes of recipients (treated group) and of non-recipients (control group) will be compared. As 
participation possibly is selective, meaning that the observed and unobserved characteristics of both 
groups may be different, a different outcome for both groups may not only be a consequence of the 
treatment, but could also be due to these other differences.  
Over and above this classical selection problem, we have to take into account a dynamic selection 
problem, since the more employable workers on average will leave unemployment sooner, and 
therefore will have a smaller probability to be treated. 
To solve these problems, we control for differences between the treated group and the control group 
based on both observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Selection on observables is taken 
into account by conditioning the hazard rates on the explanatory variables mentioned in Table 1. 
Selection on unobserved characteristics is taken into account by making use of the Timing of Events 
approach (Abbring and van den Berg 2003, 2004). This method exploits the fact that unobserved 
heterogeneity affects the transition to regular employment throughout the unemployment spell, 
whereas the treatment may only influence this transition from the moment at which the treatment 
occurs. Since the treatment and the outcome typically follow each other quickly, it is possible to 
distinguish between the treatment effect and the selection effect without imposing ‘exclusion 
restrictions’ on the observed explanatory variables. In what follows, we specify the econometric model 
and discuss the identification of the treatment effect. 
4.1 The econometric model 
The Timing of Events approach involves estimating a competing-risks duration model in which 
transition rates are proportional to observed and unobserved explanatory variables, denoted X and V = 
(Vr, Ve), respectively. In what follows, the index r refers to the treatment, and the index e refers to 
regular employment 4 . The observed explanatory variables X and the unobserved variable V are 
independently distributed. In this model, transitions to the treatment and to regular employment are 
represented by two random latent continuous durations, Tr and Te, with tr and te denoting their 
realizations. The joint distribution of Te, Tr|X, V is expressed as the product of the following 
conditional distributions: Tr|X = x, Vr and Te|Tr = tr, X = x, Ve. These distributions are in turn 
completely determined by the corresponding hazard rates θr(t|x, Vr) and θe(t|tr, x, Ve), where t is the 
elapsed duration in unemployment (t = 0 at the start of the unemployment spell). We are interested in 
the causal effect of tr on the transition rate to regular employment θe(t|tr, x, Ve). 
                                                          
4  One of the explanatory variables (the variation of the unemployment rate in the district of 
residence) is time varying, but we do not make this explicit for notational convenience. 
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Since we cannot observe V, further assumptions are required for the identification of the causal impact 
of the treatment. The main identification problem arises because treated individuals are not randomly 
selected from the population. If the unobserved determinants of the transition to the treatment and to 
regular employment, Vr and Ve, are dependent, then the distribution of Ve among the treated group 
cannot be equal to the population distribution. Participants will on average have high values of Vr and, 
given the dependence, have values of Ve that differ from those of the nonparticipating population. 
When the correlation is positive, participants with a high value for Ve, i.e. persons with a high 
propensity to leave unemployment, will on average have a high value for Vr, meaning they will tend to 
obtain a treatment rather early in their unemployment spell, whereas person with a low value for Ve, 
whom we expect to remain longer in unemployment, will on average have less chance to obtain a 
treatment. A positive correlation therefore implies that participation will be selective, and  will be a 
biased estimator of the true impact (an overestimation in this case). In the case of a negative 
correlation,  will be underestimate the true impact. 
A second reason for selection on Ve is dynamic sorting: in order to get treated, individuals may not 
have left unemployment for a regular job before tr and must therefore have relatively low values of Ve 
in comparison to the sampled population. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) show under which 
assumptions one can identify the true causal effect of the treatment from the spurious effect induced 
by the aforementioned selection effects. We discuss these in Section 4.2.  
We now turn to the specification and derivation of the likelihood function. The hazards are specified in 
the following Mixed Proportional (MPH) form:  
	|	, 
,  = 	 .		

 + 	|, 
.  >  +	    (1) 
	|	
,  = 	 . 
	
 	+ 	       (2) 
where λr(t) and λe(t) represent the baseline hazard for transitions to the treatment and to regular 
employment, respectively, and I(.) is an indicator function, equal to 1 if the argument is true and to 0 
otherwise. Consequently, δ(t|tr, x) measures the impact of a transition to the treatment on the transition 
to regular employment This impact may vary with the elapsed unemployment duration t, with the 
starting time of the treatment tr and with x. Consequently, the treatment effect may also depend on the 
elapsed time since the treatment. Note, however, that δ(t|tr, x) cannot depend on an unobserved 
covariate. We will discuss the consequence of this restriction in Section 4.2.  
In our basic model, we distinguish between three different treatment types: a referral, an invitation and 
an automatic referral. It is assumed that these treatment types are the outcome of a similar selection 
process. Therefore only one selection equation has to be specified. The three treatments enter the 
employment hazard as follows: 
	|	, 
,  = 	 .		

 +	|, 
.  >  +			with k=1,…,3   (1’) 
When an individual receives more than one treatment during the course of the unemployment spell, 
only the first occurrence will be selected. This can either be a referral, an invitation or an automatic 
referral. If a second treatment occurs at a later duration, the unemployment duration is right censored 
at that point. For each of the three treatment types, we distinguish between the immediate effect and 
the long term effect (van den Berg e.a. 2014). The immediate effect relates to the month during which 
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the treatment was obtained, and the subsequent month. The long term effect relates to all later months 
in the unemployment spell. 
In order to examine whether the treatment effect is heterogeneous, we also present a more elaborate 
model where we interact the treatment indicator with a limited number of the observed explanatory 
variables x. We allow the treatment to depend on (1) the elapsed unemployment duration at  
treatment5, (2) the level of education (having a tertiary degree or not) (4) the age6, (5) the sex and (6) 
the local unemployment rate at the moment of getting the treatment. These interactions seem 
interesting from a policy perspective. 
In our data, we do not measure time continuously, but on a monthly basis. This time-grouping has 
consequences for identification, which we discuss in Section 4.2. The time-grouping is explicitly taken 
into account in the specification of the baseline hazard and of the likelihood function. We exploit the 
fact that the exact date of treatment is known: in a month in which a treatment is obtained, one can 
distinguish the fraction of the month before the treatment, and the fraction of the month, starting at the 
day of the treatment (see Appendix for details). 
To take the time grouping into account, the baseline hazard is specified as piecewise-constant.  For 
both hazards, the time line is divided in 12 intervals of different length (month 2 (the first month is not 
observed), month 3, month 4, month 5, month 6, month 7, month 8, months 9-10, months 11-12, 
months 13-16, months 17-28, months 28-45). 
As very short spells of persons who enter and leave unemployment in the same month (either with or 
without treatment) are not observed, we have to take into account that all persons in the observed 
sample survived the inflow month. Therefore the likelihood must be written conditional on surviving 
the first month, i.e. conditional on neither treatment nor exit to employment in the 1st month (see 
Appendix for details). 
The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood. We distinguish between five types of likelihood 
contributions: (1) l1 for individuals who neither got treated, nor exited to employment. These 
observations are right censored in both durations at (m-1) 7; (2) l2 for individuals who leave for 
employment within [m-1, m), with m>1, without having been treated; (3) l3 for individuals who are 
treated within [k-1,k), but who remain in unemployment and are right censored at (m-1), (4) l4 for 
individuals who are treated within [k-1,k), and leave towards employment in [m-1, m), with m > k, 
and (5) l5 for individuals who are treated within [k-1,k), and leave towards employment in [m-1, m), 
with m = k.  We derive these likelihood contributions by explicitly taking the monthly grouping of the 
data into account. In a first step, we derive these likelihood contributions conditional on the 
unobserved covariates V (see Appendix for the details of this derivation). Subsequently, we derive the 
unconditional likelihood contributions by integrating V out: 
 =	  ⁄ d!						for	s=1,…,5)      (3) 
                                                          
5  In order to allow for non-linear effects, also the square of the unemployment duration at the point of 
treatment is included. 
6  Here also age squared is included. 
7  Unemployed persons experiencing a transition to inactivity or to training are censored when 
making this transition. Those who are unemployed during the whole observation period are censored 
at the end of September 2010. 
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where G(V) is the joint distribution function of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, and D0 is the 
conditioning event taking into account that there is neither treatment nor exit to employment in the 1st 
month. Gaure et al. (2007) show that in order to get unbiased estimates, one has to specify the 
heterogeneity distribution correctly. In order to do so, we implement a non-parametric approximation 
of the heterogeneity distribution (Lindsay 1983; Heckman and Singer 1984). The distribution of 
unobservables is approximated by a discrete mixture distribution with an unknown number of mass 
points. We assume that the vectors of unobserved attributes (vri, vei) are jointly discretely distributed. 
The number of mass points is determined by adding consecutively mass points as long as the AIC-
criterion decreases (Gaure et al. 2007). 
We used the BHHH-algorithm to maximize the likelihood.  
4.2  Identification of the treatment effect 
Abbring and van den Berg (2003) showed that δ(t|tp, x) is non-parametrically identified for single-
spell data provided that:  
Assumption (1): Agents do not anticipate the starting date of the treatment. They may however know 
the distribution of this moment, implying that the unemployed workers are allowed to know in 
advance that a referral or invitation can arrive at each moment, as long as they don't know the exact 
timing of the future arrival. 
Assumption (2): The econometrician has sufficiently precise information concerning the timing of 
transitions. 
Assumption (3): Observed and unobserved individual characteristics influence the rates of transitions 
(to treatment and to regular employment) of untreated individuals proportionally. 
Assumption (4): The treatment effect may not be heterogeneous in unobserved characteristics of 
participants. 
Assumption (5): There are at least two non-linearly dependent continuous explanatory variables. 
Assumption (6): Variables X and V are independently distributed. 
Assumption (7): There are no unobserved random shocks correlated with the timing of the treatment. 
Let us discuss these assumptions in turn. 
Assumption (1) If workers anticipate the starting date of the treatment, then they could use this 
information to modify their behavior accordingly. If this was the case, then these individuals should be 
considered as treated, from the moment they change their behavior. Considering these workers as 
members of the control group would bias the treatment effect. Anticipation could occur, e.g. if a 
worker knows that she will receive a referral in the near future, and therefore reduces here present job 
search intensity. As both referrals and automatic referrals arrive unannounced, no anticipation bias is 
to be expected. For invitations, the situation is more complex. With an invitation, the unemployed 
worker is invited to attend to a meeting at the PES at a later date. These meetings can result in 
referrals. For these referrals, obviously there can be an anticipation problem. In order to avoid this 
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problem, we chose the date at which the invitation itself was sent as the point of treatment, as also 
invitations arrive unannounced.  
It is important to distinguish anticipation effects from ex ante effects (Abbring and van den Berg 2004; 
Richardson and van den Berg 2008; van den Berg et al. 2009). An ex ante effect occurs if the 
transition rate to regular employment of non-participants is affected by the mere existence of a 
treatment. The ex ante knowledge of the existence of referrals and invitations may affect the 
distribution of transitions to work. For instance, if an unemployed worker wants to prevent being 
invited for a meeting at the PES, he may change his search strategy by accepting job offers that he 
otherwise would not have accepted. Note that, since the ex ante effect concerns a spillover effect of the 
treatment on non-participants, it can be regarded as a specific general equilibrium effect of the 
treatment. In any case, given the relatively small burden imposed on unemployed workers by referrals 
and invitations, we expect these general equilibrium effects to be negligible. The analysis at hand 
identifies an ex post effect. The ex post effect measures, for a given environment with the policy in 
place, the effect of a referral or invitation on the individual transition rate to a regular job. This effect 
is identified even in the presence of ex ante effects, as long as there is no anticipation.  
Assumption (2) One could argue that this condition is not satisfied, since the duration data are grouped 
into months. However, using an extensive Monte Carlo analysis, Gaure et al. (2007) have shown that 
Abbring and van den Berg (2003)’s method is extremely reliable for time-grouped data as long the 
time-grouping is explicitly taken into account in the formulation of the likelihood function. Since we 
implement a grouped duration version of the Timing of Events approach, we satisfy this requirement. 
The results of Gaure et al. (2007) suggest that the observed effects can be identified with time-grouped 
data. This means that the model is able to disentangle selection effects from treatment effects and will 
be able to predict the observed grouped duration outcomes correctly.  
Assumption (3) The assumption of proportionality is fundamental. Gaure et al. (2007) have shown that 
strong departures from non-proportionality can induce serious biases. In principle, we could test for 
departures from the MPH assumption, since in the presence of a time-varying exogenous covariate, 
such as the unemployment rate in the current application, this assumption is no longer required for 
identification (Brinch 2007; Richardson and Van den Berg 2008). Testing for such specification 
problems is, however, beyond the scope of the current paper. Note that the MPH assumption is not 
required for the specification of the treatment effect δ(t|tr, x): x may be correlated with unemployment 
duration t or the elapsed duration since the start of the treatment (t − tr). This holds only, however, if 
the treatment effect does not vary with unobservable characteristics.  
Assumption (4) In principle, we can allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment effect if the 
transition rate of treated participants to regular employment is proportional in all three arguments 
(unemployment duration, observed and unobserved characteristics). This holds as long as this 
transition rate depends neither on the moment of entry into treatment, nor on the period of time 
elapsed since that moment. Alternatively, Richardson and Van den Berg (2008) prove non-parametric 
identification of a model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment effect if the last 
mentioned transition: (i) is proportional in the period of time elapsed since entry into the program (t 
−tr), and in observed and unobserved characteristics, but (ii) does not depend on unemployment 
duration (t) nor on the moment since entry (tr). Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment 
effect would complicate the analysis drastically. We therefore maintain the assumption that the 
treatment effect is homogeneous with respect to unobservables. Consequently, we must take care in 
interpreting the time profile of the treatment effect with the time since the start of the treatment. 
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Richardson and Van den Berg (2008) point out that this time profile may be biased downwards by a 
dynamic sorting effect: Treated individuals with unobserved characteristics such that their treatment 
effect is high (holding every other characteristic constant) are more likely to leave unemployment 
quickly.  
Assumption (5) This is a technically sufficient condition for identification if there are no time-varying 
explanatory variables. We meet this requirement here, since age and the unemployment rate are two 
continuous explanatory variables. Note, however, that in our empirical application this condition is not 
essential, since the model is overidentified by including the unemployment rate as a time-varying 
covariate. Using an extensive Monte Carlo analysis, Gaure et al. (2007, p. 1186) show that, with 
‘some exogenous variation in hazard rates over calendar time, no subject-specific covariates are 
required in order to identify treatment and spell-duration effects’.  
Assumption (6) It is unlikely that unobservable and observable covariates are independent of each 
other. However, a violation of this assumption need not affect the consistency of our main parameter 
of interest, δ. In this case, it only means that we can no longer give a structural interpretation to the 
coefficients of the observed covariates, x (see Chamberlain 1980; Wooldridge 2002, p. 487; Crépon et 
al. 2005, p. 14; for a similar argumentation in the context of transition models). For a closer look, we 
first consider Chamberlain (1980)’s random effects Probit model in a panel setup. This model allows 
for correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables by assuming that the 
conditional distribution of the unobserved effect is Normal with a conditional expectation that is a 
linear index in the observed explanatory variables. With these assumptions, we can identify the 
structural parameters associated with the time-varying covariates. The parameters associated with the 
time-constant covariates, however, cannot be identified from the linear conditional expectation of the 
unobserved covariate. In the context of transition models, one can make a similar assumption. For 
instance, assume that the unobserved heterogeneity terms conditional on observed covariates x, can be 
written as follows: 
υxjk = υjk exp(x’γj) for j = e, r and k = 1, 2         (4) 
where υjk does not depend on x. With this assumption, it is clear that γj (j = e, r) cannot be disentangled 
from the structural parameters βj. However, this does not affect the consistency of the parameters of 
interest characterizing the treatment effect δ(t|tr, x) In principle, this treatment effect may even depend 
on x, as long as the treatment effect itself does not depend on unobservables—as discussed under 
Assumption (4). Finally, this argument holds only to the extent that the unobserved terms are related to 
x as expressed in Eq. 4. Such an assumption is, however, not stronger than the one required for the 
consistency of the widely used Chamberlain (1980)’s random effects Probit model.  
Assumption (7) This assumption is not explicitly imposed in Abbring and Van den Berg (2003, 2004), 
but is implicit in the model. We try to avoid seasonal or business cycle shocks that could be correlated 
with the start of the treatment by conditioning on a time-varying indicator of the local unemployment 
rate. 
5. Results 
The estimation results are reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Table 2 reports the estimates of the transition 
to treatment and Table 3 reports the estimates of the transition towards employment. Table 4 gives 
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some general model characteristics. Information about unobserved heterogeneity is included at the 
bottom of Table 3. 
In each table information about three different specifications can be found: (a) a base specification 
where no correction for unobserved heterogeneity is applied; (b) the same specification, but enhanced 
with a correction for unobserved heterogeneity; and (c) the previous specification, enhanced with 
several interaction effects between the treatment effect and specific explanatory variables. These 
interactions allow checking whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects.  
We always report four elements: (1) “b”, the estimated coefficients; (2) “exp(b)-1”, which gives the 
change (as compared to the reference category) in the exit to respectively treatment (table 2) and 
employment (table 3)8; (3) “s.e.”, the standard error of the estimated coefficient; and (4) “p val”, the 
corresponding p-value. 
For each of the three different treatment types (i.e. referral, invitation and automatic referral), two 
effects are estimated, an immediate effect and a long term effect. The direct effect gives the change in 
the exit rate to employment at the end of the month in which the treatment was obtained (and in the 
following month). The results at the left hand side of Table 3 indicate that the immediate effect for the 
three different treatment types are, respectively 0,55; 0,31 and 0,06, suggesting that the treatment 
effect is positive for all treatment types (albeit very small for the automatic referral). However, in this 
specification selection on unobservables has not yet been taken into account, and as mentioned in the 
previous section, this can cause a bias with an a priori unknown sign.  The unobserved heterogeneity 
terms at the bottom of table 3 indicate that there is a strong negative correlation between the 
unobserved terms of both hazards, suggesting that persons who get treated, on average are less 
employable than persons who do not get the treatment. This implies that a specification that does not 
control for unobserved heterogeneity will underestimate the treatment effect. In what follows, we will 
therefore focus on the results of the specifications that do correct for unobserved heterogeneity. 
The results of both specifications that do correct for unobserved heterogeneity suggest that the direct 
effects for the three treatment types are large and statistically significant. The immediate effect on the 
transition towards employment is consistently the largest for referrals, somewhat smaller for getting an 
invitation, and smallest for the automatic referrals. The estimated effects appear to be very high: a 
referral increases the exit to employment (in the second specification) with 207%, getting an invitation 
changes the exit rate to employment with 123%, and an automatic referral still increases this exit rate 
with 51%. One should however take into account that (1) these are short term effects; and (2) that this 
effect is relative to what the exit would have been in the counterfactual of no participation. As the 
analysis of the unobserved heterogeneity terms indicates, treated participants on average are less 
employable than persons who do not get the treatment, suggesting that their exit probabilities in the 
absence of treatment would have been relatively small. 
  
 
                                                          
8  In the left hand side model of table 2, the coefficient for sex is -0,18. When we take [exp(-0,18) – 1], 
the result is -0,16, indicating that the exit rate for women towards a treatment is 16% lower than the exit rate 
for men.  
EFFECTIVENESS OF A JOB VACANCY REFERRAL SCHEME 
 
WSE REPORT   18 
 
Table 2  Duration model estimates: transition to treatment 
Variables No unobserved heterogeneity Unobserved heterogeneity: base model Unobserved heterogeneity: model with 
interactions 
 b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. 
Constant -2.83 -0.94 0.12 0.000 -2.94 -0.95 0.18 0.000 -2.98 -0.95 0.20 0.000 
Sex (reference  man) -0.18 -0.16 0.04 0.000 -0.17 -0.16 0.04 0.000 -0.18 -0.16 0.04 0.000 
Age  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.133 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.106 
Age squared/100 -0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.000 -0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.000 -0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.000 
# months unempl. in the preceding 2 years 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.000 
Educational level             
No secondary  0.54 0.72 0.10 0.000 0.56 0.75 0.10 0.000 0.56 0.75 0.10 0.000 
Secondary 0.41 0.51 0.11 0.000 0.43 0.53 0.11 0.000 0.43 0.53 0.11 0.000 
Tertiary education (outside university) 0.33 0.39 0.10 0.001 0.34 0.40 0.10 0.001 0.34 0.41 0.10 0.001 
Tertiary (university) (reference)             
Educational track (if secondary level)             
General track -0.09 -0.08 0.08 0.275 -0.08 -0.08 0.08 0.325 -0.08 -0.08 0.08 0.306 
Technical track 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.769 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.856 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.808 
Vocational track 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.052 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.034 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.037 
Province of residence             
Antwerp (reference)             
Vlaams Brabant -0.16 -0.15 0.07 0.022 -0.13 -0.12 0.08 0.098 -0.14 -0.13 0.08 0.075 
West Vlaanderen -0.12 -0.11 0.07 0.070 -0.11 -0.11 0.07 0.093 -0.12 -0.11 0.07 0.084 
Oost Vlaanderen -0.26 -0.23 0.05 0.000 -0.25 -0.22 0.05 0.000 -0.26 -0.23 0.05 0.000 
Limburg 0.19 0.20 0.05 0.001 0.19 0.21 0.05 0.001 0.19 0.21 0.05 0.001 
Driving license 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.327 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.592 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.485 
Mother tongue = Dutch 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.005 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.019 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.021 
Belgian 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.070 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.068 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.070 
Regional unemp. rate (time varying) -0.10 -0.09 0.02 0.000 -0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.000 -0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.000 
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Table 2 Continued 
Variables No unobserved heterogeneity Unobserved heterogeneity: base 
model 
Unobserved heterogeneity: model 
with interactions 
 b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. 
Baseline hazard             
Months 28-45 -1.90 -0.85 0.24 0.000 -2.04 -0.87 0.25 0.000 -2.01 -0.87 0.26 0.000 
Months 17-28 -1.35 -0.74 0.12 0.000 -1.49 -0.77 0.14 0.000 -1.46 -0.77 0.15 0.000 
Months 13-16 -0.71 -0.51 0.10 0.000 -0.83 -0.56 0.12 0.000 -0.81 -0.56 0.13 0.000 
Months 11-12 -0.36 -0.30 0.10 0.000 -0.46 -0.37 0.11 0.000 -0.45 -0.36 0.11 0.000 
Months 9-10 -0.59 -0.44 0.09 0.000 -0.69 -0.50 0.10 0.000 -0.68 -0.49 0.11 0.000 
8th month -0.22 -0.20 0.09 0.014 -0.31 -0.27 0.10 0.002 -0.30 -0.26 0.10 0.004 
7th month -0.59 -0.45 0.09 0.000 -0.67 -0.49 0.10 0.000 -0.66 -0.49 0.10 0.000 
6th month -0.43 -0.35 0.08 0.000 -0.51 -0.40 0.09 0.000 -0.50 -0.39 0.09 0.000 
5th month -0.38 -0.31 0.07 0.000 -0.44 -0.36 0.07 0.000 -0.44 -0.35 0.08 0.000 
4th month -0.18 -0.17 0.06 0.002 -0.24 -0.21 0.06 0.000 -0.23 -0.21 0.06 0.000 
3rd month -0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.127 -0.11 -0.11 0.05 0.029 -0.11 -0.10 0.05 0.035 
2nd month (reference)             
The variables age and the regional unemployment rate are centered around their mean 
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Table 3 Duration model estimates: transition to employment 
Variables No unobserved heterogeneity Unobserved heterogeneity: base model Unobserved heterogeneity: model with 
interactions 
 b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. 
Constant -1.28 -0.72 0.06 0.000 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.433 0.23 0.26 0.59 0.697 
Sex (reference: man) -0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.000 -0.54 -0.41 0.11 0.000 -0.45 -0.36 0.17 0.009 
Age  -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.000 -0.13 -0.12 0.01 0.000 -0.12 -0.11 0.01 0.000 
Age squared/100 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.000 -0.24 -0.21 0.06 0.000 -0.22 -0.20 0.07 0.001 
# months unempl. in the preceding 2 years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.235 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.149 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.429 
Educational level             
No secondary  -0.25 -0.22 0.05 0.000 -1.09 -0.66 0.24 0.000 -1.24 -0.71 0.31 0.000 
Secondary -0.19 -0.17 0.06 0.001 -0.89 -0.59 0.28 0.001 -0.97 -0.62 0.31 0.002 
Tertiary education (outside university) -0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.180 -0.32 -0.27 0.23 0.162 -0.41 -0.34 0.24 0.083 
Tertiary (university) (reference)             
Educational track (if secondary level)             
General track -0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.130 -0.50 -0.39 0.26 0.052 -0.45 -0.36 0.33 0.172 
Technical track 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.648 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.381 0.06 0.06 0.24 0.802 
Vocational track 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.195 -0.09 -0.09 0.18 0.629 -0.04 -0.04 0.23 0.853 
Province of residence             
Antwerp (reference)             
Vlaams Brabant -0.21 -0.19 0.04 0.000 -1.47 -0.77 0.22 0.000 -1.30 -0.73 0.25 0.000 
West Vlaanderen -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.413 -0.31 -0.27 0.14 0.031 -0.23 -0.21 0.17 0.162 
Oost Vlaanderen -0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.037 -0.36 -0.30 0.15 0.014 -0.26 -0.23 0.15 0.090 
Limburg 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.466 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.386 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.471 
Driving license 0.22 0.24 0.03 0.000 1.50 3.50 0.19 0.000 1.29 2.64 0.25 0.000 
Mother tongue = Dutch 0.25 0.29 0.03 0.000 1.22 2.39 0.14 0.000 1.27 2.56 0.18 0.000 
Belgian 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.098 0.43 0.54 0.19 0.026 0.48 0.61 0.42 0.253 
Regional unemp. rate (time varying) -0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.000 -0.50 -0.39 0.03 0.000 -0.51 -0.40 0.03 0.000 
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Table 3  Continued 
Variables No unobserved heterogeneity Unobserved heterogeneity: base model Unobserved heterogeneity: model with 
interactions 
 b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. 
Baseline hazard             
Months 28-45 -2.70 -0.93 0.16 0.000 2.29 8.85 0.29 0.000 1.96 6.09 0.31 0.000 
Months 17-28 -2.31 -0.90 0.09 0.000 2.02 6.56 0.22 0.000 1.86 5.45 0.23 0.000 
Months 13-16 -1.63 -0.80 0.07 0.000 2.02 6.56 0.19 0.000 1.90 5.71 0.19 0.000 
Months 11-12 -1.29 -0.73 0.07 0.000 2.04 6.70 0.17 0.000 1.95 6.03 0.17 0.000 
Months 9-10 -1.17 -0.69 0.06 0.000 1.86 5.41 0.14 0.000 1.78 4.93 0.15 0.000 
8th month -1.02 -0.64 0.06 0.000 1.75 4.78 0.13 0.000 1.68 4.39 0.13 0.000 
7th month -0.99 -0.63 0.06 0.000 1.56 3.77 0.12 0.000 1.50 3.50 0.12 0.000 
6th month -0.92 -0.60 0.05 0.000 1.36 2.88 0.10 0.000 1.31 2.70 0.10 0.000 
5th month -0.84 -0.57 0.04 0.000 1.14 2.11 0.08 0.000 1.10 2.00 0.09 0.000 
4th month -0.60 -0.45 0.04 0.000 0.99 1.69 0.07 0.000 0.96 1.62 0.07 0.000 
3rd month -0.32 -0.27 0.03 0.000 0.69 0.99 0.05 0.000 0.67 0.95 0.05 0.000 
2nd month (reference)             
Effect of referral             
Month of referral and next month 0.55 0.74 0.05 0.000 1.12 2.07 0.11 0.000 1.14 2.11 0.21 0.000 
Afterwards 0.30 0.35 0.07 0.000 1.12 2.08 0.16 0.000 1.12 2.05 0.25 0.000 
Effect of invitation             
Month of invitation and next month 0.31 0.37 0.05 0.000 0.80 1.23 0.12 0.000 0.80 1.23 0.20 0.000 
Afterwards 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.050 0.82 1.28 0.17 0.000 0.77 1.17 0.25 0.000 
Effect of automatic referral             
Month of aut. refer. and next month 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.521 0.41 0.51 0.15 0.006 0.42 0.53 0.22 0.059 
Afterwards 0.24 0.28 0.09 0.007 0.70 1.01 0.19 0.000 0.71 1.03 0.26 0.007 
Interaction with:             
Unemployment duration when treated         -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.806 
Unemployment duration squared/100         0.14 0.15 0.10 0.156 
Tertiary educational level          -0.11 -0.10 0.13 0.386 
The variables age and the regional unemployment rate are centered around their mean 
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Table 3  Continued 
Variables No unobserved heterogeneity Unobserved heterogeneity: base model Unobserved heterogeneity: model with 
interactions 
 b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. b eb-1 s.e. p val. 
Interactions (continued)             
Age 
    
    0.00 0.00 0.01 0.915 
Age squared /100 
    
    -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.719 
Sex (reference = man) 
    
    -0.03 -0.03 0.11 0.765 
Unemployment rate in month of treatment 
    
    0.12 0.13 0.04 0.001 
Unobserved heterogeneity 
    
        
Treatment 2 
    
0.46 0.59 0.30 0.127 0.52 0.69 0.33 0.109 
Employment 2 
    
2.71 14.05 0.16 0.000 2.57 12.11 0.19 0.000 
Masspoint 2 
    
0.48 0.62 0.10 0.000 0.49 0.64 0.13 0.000 
Treatment 3 
    
0.33 0.39 0.24 0.161 0.31 0.36 0.29 0.290 
Employment 3 
    
-8.14 -1.00 0.36 0.000 -7.84 -1.00 0.38 0.000 
Masspoint 3 
    
-1.66 -0.81 0.18 0.000 -1.61 -0.80 0.22 0.000 
Treatment 4 
    
0.20 0.22 0.17 0.261 0.24 0.28 0.20 0.221 
Employment 4 
    
-2.13 -0.88 0.13 0.000 -2.00 -0.87 0.18 0.000 
Masspoint 4 
    
-0.44 -0.36 0.09 0.000 -0.39 -0.32 0.12 0.001 
Treatment 5 
    
0.01 0.01 0.15 0.954 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.750 
Employment 5 
    
-4.05 -0.98 0.20 0.000 -3.89 -0.98 0.23 0.000 
Masspoint 5 
    
-0.55 -0.42 0.10 0.000 -0.44 -0.36 0.15 0.003 
Treatment 6 
    
0.22 0.24 0.17 0.213 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.236 
Employment 6 
    
-6.10 -1.00 0.29 0.000 -5.92 -1.00 0.32 0.000 
Masspoint 6 
    
-1.06 -0.65 0.12 0.000 -0.96 -0.62 0.15 0.000 
Probability 1 
    
0.23    0.22 
   
Probability 2 
    
0.37    0.36 
   
Probability 3 
    
0.04    0.04 
   
Probability 4 
    
0.15    0.15 
   
Probability 5 
    
0.13    0.14 
   
Probability 6 
    
0.08    0.08 
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Table 4  Model characteristics  
 No unobserved heterogeneity Unobserved heterogeneity: base 
model 
Unobserved heterogeneity: model 
with interactions 
Log-likelihood -35836.69 -35703.985 -35692.939 
Number of variables 66 84 91 
Number of observations 12983 12983 12983 
Akaike Information criterion 71805.38 71575.97 71567.88 
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At first sight somewhat more surprising is the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for the long 
term effects. One would expect that the effect of specific instruments such as a referral and an 
invitation, if any, would be concentrated in the period immediately after their application. Someone 
who gets treated and does remain in unemployment, possibly will receive another treatment. As such, 
these subsequent treatments could be an explanation for positive long term effects, but we right 
censored all spells at the moment where they obtain a second treatment, and therefore this explanation 
is excluded. Note that van den Berg. e.a. (2014) also report sizable long effects for meetings between 
the unemployed and their caseworker, which in case of women between 30 and 49 are even larger than 
the reported direct effect (as is the case in our specification for the automatic referrals). A possible 
explanation for a positive long term effect could be that obtaining the treatment, even if it does not 
immediately affects the transition to employment for everybody concerned, will in a sense alert the 
participants, as it signals that the PES is following them and is expecting them to keep investing in 
their job search. Moreover, also in the case of the long term effects it should be noted that the effect is 
relative to what the exit would have been in the counterfactual of no participation.  
In the third specification, interaction effects between the treatment effect and specific explanatory 
variables are included. Of these, only the local unemployment rate in the treatment month is 
significant. The positive results indicates that treatment effects are higher if the local unemployment 
rate is higher, which is comparable to the effect reported by van den Berg e.a. 2013 for Germany. The 
absence of a significant effect in the interaction with the unemployment duration suggests that the 
effectiveness of the treatment does not depend on the unemployment duration. The same observation 
can be made with respect to the age and the sex of the participants.  
6. Conclusion 
As in many other countries, also in Flanders, the northern part of Belgium, the public employment 
service makes use of vacancy referrals in order to facilitate the matching between unemployed 
workers and vacancies. In this article we evaluate the effectiveness of this policy. We differentiate 
between three treatment types: (1) referrals, in which case the match is supervised by a caseworker, 
who also contacts the unemployed worker by phone or by e-mail; (2) automatic referrals, where there 
is no caseworker intervention and matches are made by matching software; (3) invitations, where the 
unemployed worker is invited for a meeting at the PES. As result of this meeting either or not a 
referral will follow. Here we look at the effect of obtaining an invitation as such, whether it is 
followed by a referral or not. 
We use a sample of 12983 unemployment spells that started in 2007. In order to identify the treatment 
effect, we use a “timing of events”-approach. This approach allows to distinguish between the 
treatment effect on the one hand, and selection on un-observables on the other hand. 
We find large and significant direct effects of the exit to employment in the month in which the 
treatment is given and in the subsequent month. These effects are positive for the three treatment 
types, although the effect for a referral is the largest, and the effect for an automatic referral is 
smallest, while the effect of invitations is situated in between. Also the long term effects on the exit to 
employment are substantial for the three treatment types. An explanation could be that the treatments 
serve as a job search monitor device, alert the unemployed workers that the PES is following them and 
is expecting them to keep investing in their job search. 
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These results are interesting, especially given the fact that the cost of this treatments is relatively small 
when compared with e.g. (vocational) training programs for the unemployed. 
There are some avenues for further research. One interesting extension would be to remove the right 
censoring when a second treatment occurs, and modelling the effect of a second treatment and of 
subsequent treatments. 
Appendix 
The likelihood function for time grouped data 
The exit from unemployment towards employment can only be observed on a monthly basis. 
Therefore we have time grouped data. Gaure e.a. 2007 show that interval-censoring is unproblematic, 
as long as this is taken into account in the likelihood function.  In this appendix, we give the likelihood 
contributions for time grouped data, conditional on observed and unobserved variables. We exploit the 
fact that the exact date of treatment is known: in a month in which a treatment is obtained, one can 
distinguish the fraction of the month before the treatment, and the fraction of the month, starting at the 
day of the treatment. Another element that will be taken into account, relates to the fact that very short 
spells of persons who enter and leave unemployment in the same month (either with or without 
referral) are not observed in the data. Finally, we will show how a likelihood function can be obtained 
that is unconditional on the unobservables. 
To take the time grouping into account, the baseline hazard is specified as piecewise-constant.  For 
both hazards, the time line is divided in 12 intervals of different length (month 2 (the first month is not 
observed), month 3, month 4, month 5, month 6, month 7, month 8, months 9-10, months 11-12, 
months 13-16, months 17-28, months 28-45). 
The first likelihood contribution relates to individuals who neither got treated, nor exited to 
employment. These observations are right censored in both durations at (m-1), and their likelihood 
contribution is given by the survivor probability: * = 	Pr 	, 	-.*, 	, 	 -.*	|	
,  ,  
												= 	exp	 23 4567 	|	
,  , 8  67	|	
, 89-.*7:; <															 
The second likelihood contribution relates to individuals who leave for employment within [m-1, m), 
with m>1, without having been treated: ; = Pr 	-.* = , >	 - , 	, 	 -	|	
,  , 	 
												= ? -	|	
,  , -	|	
,  ,   -	|	
, 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																	×	Aexp	 2− 4567 	|	
,  , 8 + 67 	|	
, 89-.*7:; <B 
																	×	 C1 −	 5
	−-	|	
,  ,  − -	|	
, 9DE					 
The third likelihood contribution relates to individuals who leave for program participation within [k-
1,k), but who remain in unemployment and are right censored at (m-1):  F = Pr 	, >	-.*, 	.* < , ≤	 |	
,  , 	 												= 	 G	|	
,  
																		× 	Aexp	 2−4567 	|	
,  , 8 + 67 	|	
, 89.*7:;
− 	|	
,  ,  + 	|	
, t-k+1<B 
																	×	Aexp	 2−	|	
,  , k-t − 4 567	|	
,  , 89-.*7:K* <BL 
The fourth likelihood contribution relates to individuals who leave for program participation within [k-
1,k), and leave towards employment in [m-1, m), with m > k: M = Pr 	-.* < , ≤	 - , 	.* < , ≤	 |	
,  , 	 												= 	 G	|	
,  
																		× 	Aexp	 2−4567 	|	
,  , 8 + 67 	|	
, 89.*7:;
− 	|	
,  ,  + 	|	
, t-k+1<B 
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																	×	Aexp	 23	|	
,  , k-t 3 4 567	|	
,  , 89-.*7:K* <B 
																		×	5exp	3-	|	
,  ,  3 19N 
The fifth likelihood contribution relates to individuals who leave for program participation within [k-
1,k), and leave towards employment in [m-1, m), with m = k: O = Pr 	.* = , >	  , 	.* = , >	 |	
,  , 	 											= 	 G	|	
,  
																			×	Aexp	 234567 	|	
,  , 8  67 	|	
, 89.*7:;
3 	|	
,  ,   	|	
, t-k1<B 
																			×	51	-	exp	3-	|	
,  , k-t9N 
As very short spells of persons who enter and leave unemployment in the same month (either with or 
without treatment) are not observed, we have to take into account that all persons in the observed 
sample survived the inflow month. Therefore the likelihood must be written conditional on surviving 
the first month, i.e. conditional on neither treatment nor exit to employment in the 1st month. The 
conditioning event is given by D0(V): 
 = 	P exp 23 PQ 3 	|	
,  ,   Q 3 	|	
, RQ*ST < R
*
  
													= U 1*	|	
,  ,   *	|	
, 	 
									×	C1 3	5
	3*	|	
,  ,  3 *	|	
, 9DE 
The first integral relates to the fact that the day of entering unemployment is unknown, and therefore 
any day of the month is given an equal probability. 
Likelihood contributions l1(V) until l5(V) and the conditioning event D0(V) are conditional on the 
unobservables V. The unconditional likelihood contributions are obtained by integrating V out: 
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 =	P ⁄ d!						for	s=1,…,5)  
where G(V) is the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms. Unobserved heterogeneity 
is specified non-parametrically, using the approach of Heckman & Singer 1984. The distribution of 
unobservables is approximated by a discrete mixture distribution with an unknown number of mass 
points. We assume that the vectors of unobserved attributes (vri, vei) are jointly discretely distributed. 
The number of mass points is determined by adding consecutively mass points as long as the AIC-
criterion decreases (Gaure e.a. 2007). 
Subsequently, the unconditional log-likelihood can be written as the sum of the individual log-
likelihood contributions: 
V = 	4GW*X ln *X  W;X ln ;X  WFX ln FX  WMX ln MX 	WOX ln OX 3 lnX 		[\X:*  
where csi = 1 if lsi is the contribution of individual i to the likelihood, and csi = 0 otherwise. 
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